Towards authorisation models for secure information sharing: a survey and research agenda by Salim, Farzad et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as: 
 
Salim, Farzad and Reid, Jason F. and Dawson, Edward (2010) Towards 
authorisation models for secure information sharing : a survey and research 
agenda. ISeCure, The ISC International Journal of Information Security, 2. (In 
Press) 
© Copyright 2010 Please consult the authors 
1Towards Authorisation Models for Secure
Information Sharing: A Survey and Research
Agenda
Farzad Salim, Jason Reid, Ed Dawson
Information Security Institute,
Queensland University of Technology
GPO Box 2434, Brisbane Queensland 4001, Australia
Email:{farzad, reid, e.dawson}@isi.qut.edu.au
Abstract—This article presents a survey of authorisation
models and considers their ‘fitness-for-purpose’ in facilitat-
ing information sharing. Network-supported information
sharing is an important technical capability that underpins
collaboration in support of dynamic and unpredictable
activities such as emergency response, national security,
infrastructure protection, supply chain integration and
emerging business models based on the concept of a
‘virtual organisation’. The article argues that present
authorisation models are inflexible and poorly scalable in
such dynamic environments due to their assumption that
the future needs of the system can be predicted, which in
turn justifies the use of persistent authorisation policies.
The article outlines the motivation and requirement for
a new flexible authorisation model that addresses the
needs of information sharing. It proposes that a flexible
and scalable authorisation model must allow an explicit
specification of the objectives of the system and access
decisions must be made based on a late trade-off analysis
between these explicit objectives. A research agenda for
the proposed Objective-based Access Control concept is
presented.
Index Terms—Security, Access Control, Authorisation
Model, Multi Objective Decision Making, Secure Informa-
tion Sharing, Dynamic Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic environments are rapidly emerging as com-
puting systems morph from monolithic and closed en-
tities into globally disaggregated collaborating entities
that may need to share sensitive information. There is
an emerging need for scalable access control solutions
for systems operating in such dynamic and uncertain
environments, where changes are frequent and there
are unpredictable threats as well as opportunities [84],
[47]. The dynamism and uncertainty that exists in such
environments is challenging the most basic foundation of
current access control approaches: a security policy as a
set of rules, which is the essence of an already-made
trade-off analysis between a range of system objectives
[12], [6], [56], [48].
The problem of access control is becoming more con-
textual as the dynamism of the environment increases.
In an environment where the demand for information
and the incentives provided for disclosure changes,
an entity’s posture towards information disclosure also
changes. What is and is not acceptable regarding access
must be decided on the basis of the context of current
threats and opportunities present in the environment.
In such an environment the window of predictabil-
ity that old models are based on has narrowed. This
challenges the applicability of such models, which at
their core assume a relatively static policy that is the
result of an already made trade-off analysis between
the competing requirements of the system. As Blakley
[12] points out, such policies do not scale well and
their complexity quickly increases as systems grow and
diverge. Similarly, Baker [6] points out that constructing
a security policy is a very complex task and a single
security policy may not be appropriate in a complex
system.
Authorisation underpins the ability to share sensitive
information electronically since information must only
be disclosed to authorised entities. One area where
current approaches are demonstrably inadequate is in
critical infrastructure protection [38]. Information shar-
ing among separate communities such as government
and private sector infrastructure operators (e.g., telecom-
munications, energy, finance) has become a priority for
many countries, including Australia, Canada, the UK and
the US. In Australia specifically, forums such as Trusted
Information Sharing Network (TISN) [75] have been
formed to allow owners and operators of critical infras-
tructure to work together and share sensitive information.
However, information sharing in such networks occurs
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tives of different organisations meet face-to-face. There
are significant advantages to supplementing such physi-
cal meetings with a virtual information sharing network.
This would allow for example, organisations to share
information on cyber attacks in real time. A significant
barrier to such information sharing stems from complex
technology challenges [58]. A key technology challenge
is to overcome the inflexibility and poor scalability of
existing authorisation models in dealing with changes of
the environment [12], [6], [56], [48].
Current authorisation models are based on a persistent
policy (i.e., usually written as a set of action rules:
if condition then decision) [62]. These have several
characteristics that make them undesirable for dynamic
environments. First, they are inherently rigid, situation
agnostic and poorly scalable because the policy is as-
sumed to be correct and the essence of an already
made trade-off analysis between various organisational
objectives [28]. In this context a new trade-off analysis
to produce a new policy is possible but has two important
drawbacks, inefficiency and instability of the successive
policies [3], [52]. Second, policy objectives are implicit
rather than being explicitly specified. Hence, there is no
relationship between the rules in the policy, the decision
made, and the objectives. In other words, there is no
way to answer why the decision has been made [50],
[81], [20]. Third, such policies are usually closed to
ensure decidability (i.e., they use a default rule, usually
a deny rule, that is returned for those access requests
for which there is no explicit rule in the policy). Hence
for them, the lack of knowledge for decision making is
not explicit; it corresponds to knowing that the request
must be denied. Given these issues, neither the concept
of compromise nor opportunity make sense, because
the assumption is that the initial trade-off analysis has
already predicted and taken into account any important
factor for authorisation decisions. Based on this analysis,
the required rules are assumed to exist.
There have been several attempts to address the
inflexibility of authorisation models through allowing
environment conditions to be input parameters for the
policy. These approaches have been mostly referred to as
context-based policies [74], [9], [44]. However, at their
core, they still require the environment conditions to be
predicted, the value of these conditions to be determined
and a priori decisions to be made concerning what to do
in each condition.
Other approaches have been recently proposed to
address the inflexibility of existing authorisation models.
The core of these approaches is to introduce a grey
area between granting and denying a request. In this
area exceptional and unpredicted access could be granted
[52], [21], [56]. These works have rightly identified the
need for more flexible authorisation models, however, so
far their focus has been on incremental improvements to
make the existing access control systems more flexible,
rather than identifying why they are inflexible. In other
words, what is it that all access control models have
in common which makes them inflexible? The existing
approaches are ad-hoc attempts to address part of the
inflexibility problem and fall short in their generality and
systematic specification of the problem or solution to the
problem. Based on our analysis of current authorisation
models in Section IV, we have two hypotheses:
1) The inflexibility and poor scalability of the existing
authorisation models is due to their assumption
about the predictability of the future needs of the
system, which in turn justifies the use of persistent
access control policies.
2) A flexible and scalable authorisation model must
allow an explicit specification of the objectives
of the system and an access decision must be
made based on the trade-off analysis between these
explicit objectives performed at or near runtime.
These hypotheses have led us to propose the concept
of Objective-based Access Control. The rest of this paper
is organised as follows: Section II introduces the termi-
nology used in this article. Section III sets the context of
the paper by briefly describing the characteristics of an
authorisation model for emerging dynamic environments,
while Section IV surveys authorisation models in terms
of their suitability for such environments. Section V
outlines our proposal for the concept of Objective-based
Access Control and Section VI presents our research
agenda.
II. TERMINOLOGY
Here, we informally define several important terms
used in the article to clarify their intended meaning.
• Objective is a state that one would like to achieve,
maintain or maximize. For example, confidentiality
can be considered as an objective that one would
like to maintain. Maximising throughput or income,
or maintaining reputation are further examples of
objectives.
• Policy is a set of rules and conditions for achieving
an individual objective. For example, the privacy
policy is a set of rules which define how to meet
the privacy objective.
• System/agent/player refer to an entity that has some
objectives and can make a decision regarding a
release of some information to another entity.
3• Environment is a set of conditions that are not
directly under the control of the system but might
affect the access decision. For example, government
rules and regulations, an emergency event, the num-
ber of entities joining a coalition, etc. are considered
as defining elements of the environment.
• Incentives/forces are considered as a system’s in-
terpretation of the changes in the environment with
respect to its objectives. For example, a government
regulation to fine those who breach privacy is an
incentive to consider the privacy objective impor-
tant. The access requester that offers a payment
for an access provides an incentive to a financially
motivated system to grant the access.
III. EMERGENCE OF DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS
In the past decades information systems have been
revolutionised by low-cost information and communica-
tions technology which has led organisations to pursue
their mission and derive competitive advantage through
strategic partnerships and collaboration. The Internet has
been a major enabling factor in this transition by provid-
ing a flexible medium to provide or request resources1,
which in turn has made ad-hoc collaboration between
these entities not only a possibility but a necessity
for their survival and competitiveness. An instance of
this is an organisation in a mobile ad-hoc network
that forms a coalition to respond to an emergency or
disaster. Similarly, government and private agencies that
are part of nation’s critical infrastructure (e.g., electricity,
telecommunication) collaborate and share information to
recognise and address threats and system vulnerabilities
and to minimise the consequence of adverse events. In
supply chains, entities often form dynamic coalitions that
require sharing of information and resources [72].
All of these coalitions are highly dependent on each of
the involved entities to provide the information required
for the coalition to function. However, such a need
is highly dynamic, because the information required
depends on external uncontrolled factors in the envi-
ronment; the participants who need the information and
the channel through which the information should be
shared are also dynamically determined. These are just
a short list of factors to indicate the unpredictability in-
volved. Furthermore, every entity in a coalition may have
several requirements or needs to satisfy, that determine
its posture towards information sharing. For the sake of
example, consider the secrecy of a piece of information,
reputation and monetary profit as objectives. Note that
1An abstract term for objects, information, file, documents or
services.
the balance and the importance of each of these needs
may change based on the incentives that exist at any
point in time for information sharing [50], [52], [21].
In the simple case where an entity has two important
objectives: preserving privacy and national security, the
policy for the privacy objective binds the entity to release
information to no one. Now, in a case of an epidemic
outburst, the entity might face a decision to release
confidential data for the sake of national security. Hence,
the entity can compromise its privacy objective to take
the opportunity of satisfying national security objective
and thereby address the threat of the epidemic.
The following important points should be noted, first,
the weight of objectives in relation to each other can
be considerably more subtle and environment-dependent
than the above example privacy v.s. national security.
For example, it could have been privacy v.s. monetary
profit, which could be highly dependent on the entity’s
financial situation at the time. Further, note that in the
above example, the entity that highly values privacy
protection, even in the face of a national security threat
may want to specify approaches that are less privacy
invasive, such as, one time information use, or only
allowing on-site evaluation of records. Hence, there is
no crisp boundary of satisfying privacy or not. Second,
the entity that compromises an objective (e.g., privacy)
actually operates against its policy for that specific
objective, but its decision is still aligned with its overall
need (combined objectives). Finally, note that the privacy
policy (for achieving privacy objective) is correct and the
entity must not add an exception to the policy. Ad hoc
exceptions are a common and undesirable response to ad-
dress the unpredicted need for sharing information [52].
A better approach is to handle the exception through the
trade-off analysis based on the weight/importance of the
objectives.
In the following sections we will survey existing
authorisation models and show why each of them fails
to address the above mentioned issues.
IV. SURVEY OF AUTHORISATION MODELS FOR
INFORMATION SHARING
This section presents a survey of authorisation models,
which are analysed in terms of their appropriateness in
facilitating information sharing. The survey is structured
in three broad categories: traditional models, credential-
based models, and risk-based models. The categorisation
of these approaches to authorisation is mainly based
on their basic assumptions regarding the predictability
of the needs of the system which is closely related to
the predictability of the forces and incentives of the
environment in which the system operates.
4Section IV-A briefly discusses the building blocks of
an access control system and their theoretical boundaries.
The aim is to narrow the focus of this paper to the
authorisation aspect of access control.
Section IV-B describes traditional approaches that
assume a closed, controlled and predictable environment,
where a user and their required access rights are known,
further, possible changes in the environment are also
assumed to have been foreseen and incorporated into the
policy.
Section IV-C introduces credential-based approaches
that are divided into two categories: 1) the trust man-
agement approach, which assumes the system knows
what it needs to satisfy (i.e., trust) but does not know
the identity of those users that can satisfy the need; 2)
the Digital Rights Management (DRM) approach, which
was originally designed for payment-based systems. The
DRM user model is less comprehensive and its focus is
mostly on client side enforcement of access rights.
Section IV-D analyses the recent risk-based ap-
proaches to authorisation. They assume the system has
an inherent need and benefits from information sharing.
Hence, they blend risk management with authorisation
to allow an access within an acceptable level of risk.
The assumption is that a more flexible authorisation
model would lead to more information sharing that ought
to be beneficial. Risk-based approaches are discussed
under three sections, based on how they view risk: the
survivability approach (Section IV-D1) and optimistic
approach (Section IV-D2) attempt to account for the risks
associated with denying an access, while quantified risk-
based approaches (Section IV-D3) focus on quantifying
the risks that are associated with granting access. Hence,
all the approaches are commonly attempting to reduce
the overall risk.
A. Access Control and Authorisation
Historically, administrators have controlled access to
sensitive data by associating appropriate access rights to
long-term local identities that may need to access the
resource. The actual granting of access then requires
establishing a level of confidence in a user’s claimed
identity through authentication and a determination of
access rights for the identity through authorisation. The
combination of these two tasks plus audit is referred to
as access control.
According to Samarati, et al., [62] the development of
an authorisation system can be theoretically divided into
three phases: first, the specification of the rules, on which
access is to be constrained. The collection of these rules
are referred to as a security policy. Second, there is a
formal representation of security policies, referred to as
security model. This allows the properties of the model
to be mathematically analysed and proved. Third, there is
the development of the necessary software and hardware
required to implement the security policy within the con-
straints of the model, referred to as security mechanism.
Such a separation in theory allows for security policies
to be defined, analysed and compared independent of
mechanisms and vise-versa [62].
Here we are only interested in the authorisation aspect
of access control that Anderson [5] defines as, the
process of mediating every request to resources and
data maintained by a system and determining whether
the request should be granted or denied - the process
of making an access decision. Furthermore, this paper
presents an analytical study of the characteristics of
novel authorisation models in terms of their fitness
for dynamic environments. It is not intended to be a
complete survey of all the existing authorisation models.
B. Traditional Authorisation
Traditionally, the need for access control 2 came from
two major fields: firstly, military, mainly focusing on
confidentiality of data; secondly, businesses and civilian
governments, primarily demanding flexible models for
data integrity [23]. The division between these two needs
led to the evolution of two distinct access control models,
known as mandatory and discretionary access control.
However, the limitations and rigidity of each of these
promoted further research in this area that resulted in
alternatives such as role based access control [26], and
task-based access control [73], [74] that will also be
described in the following sections.
1) Mandatory Access Control: Traditionally, Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) is associated with the multi-
level security (MLS) model of Bell and LaPadulla [8].
MLS-based MAC is a way of restricting access to
objects based on security clearances assigned to users
and security labels attached to objects within the system.
The model is designed to restrict information flow from
more secure classification levels to less secure levels.The
controls are mandatory in the sense that they are system-
enforced and cannot be modified by users or their
programs.
While the MLS model protects the confidentiality of
information, it lacks the necessary control for enforc-
ing an integrity objective, since subjects with a lower
clearance can still make modifications to objects of a
2Note that in the rest of this section when we use the term access
control model instead of authorisation model, this is only to be
consistent with the terminology used in the literature.
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proposed a model to prevent subjects from indirectly
modifying information they cannot read.
MAC models have one important characteristic that
could be identified both as a strength and a weakness:
they are concerned with one single objective, either
confidentiality or integrity. This is very interesting as
one can reason as to whether that specific objective is
being satisfied or not, every other objective ignored. For
example, neither the Bell Lapadulla nor the Biba model
care if the systems in which they are implemented have
other objectives for which the release of information
becomes a necessity. However, this is a shortcoming as
well. These policies can reduce productivity by limiting
the necessary information flow [52]. Also, the imple-
mentation of such models requires a trusted central
administrator to assign labels for all the subject and
objects within the system. The insensitivity to the other
objectives, in parallel with the growing complexity of
such systems (with several objectives) means that the
MAC models are theoretically interesting but impractical
in dynamic contexts [38].
2) Discretionary Access Control: Discretionary Ac-
cess Control (DAC) is a way of restricting access to
objects based on the identity of the user. Explicit access
rules specify the type of access to objects granted to each
identity. Access to the resource is only granted when
such an association exists. One major difference between
DAC and MAC is the discretionary nature of control, in
the sense that a subject with a certain access permission
is capable of passing that permission onto other subjects
[45]. This granting and revocation is however done under
the provision of an administrative policy.
The earliest approach to implement a DAC policy
involves the use of an Access Control Matrix [45]. In
the access control matrix model, the triple of (S,O,A)
is the representation of the system state, where S is
the set of subjects, O is the set of objects and A is
the access matrix, where rows correspond to subjects,
columns correspond to objects, and entry A[s, o] reports
the rights of s on o.
The access control matrix lies at the heart of all the
existing discretionary policy models, even though the
languages used to express the policy and approaches to
implementation differ. They all assume that the author of
the policy has already predicted the needs of the system
and made a decision on who (identity, role, property,
etc.) and under what condition is to be authorised for
a resource. As we will show in the following sections,
they only differ in the approach and expressiveness to
specify these elements.
3) Chinese Wall Model: Nash and Brewer [18] pro-
posed the Chinese wall security model to address the
needs of financial institutions where information flows
may cause conflict of interest. The aim of the Chinese
wall policy is to prevent users from accessing the infor-
mation that is in conflict with any other information that
they have already accessed. It combines the free choice
element of DAC with mandatory controls by initially
allowing a user to choose an object they wish to access,
however once an object is accessed, the other objects
that may trigger a conflict of interest rule may not be
accessed any more.
4) Role-Based Access Control: To address the man-
agement complexities of traditional access control mod-
els, Ferraiolo, et al. [25] proposed the Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) model. The main attraction behind the
use of RBAC is that it can reflect the internal structure
of the organisation for which the system is being de-
signed. RBAC restricts access to a resource based on the
business function or role the subject is performing. The
permissions to access a resource are then assigned to the
appropriate role(s), rather than directly being assigned
to subjects’ identifiers. Because permissions no longer
need to be repeatedly assigned to individual users, RBAC
scales much better than the identity based DAC models
[65], [26].
RBAC has several advantages that make it the primary
choice for the implementation of access control within a
centralised system. First, RBAC greatly simplifies the
management of the security policy. The administrator
grants each user the roles corresponding to their job
function within an organisation and when their job
changes, the administrator simply changes the roles
associated with that user. Second, in several variations
of RBAC, roles can be structured as hierarchies which
greatly simplifies the management task. Third, the least
privilege concept can be implemented in RBAC as users
can log-in using their least privileged roles and change
to the higher privileged ones only as required. Fourth,
RBAC can simulate the concept of separation of duty
by defining roles that are incompatible and cannot be
assigned to the same user (static separation of duty) or
concurrently activated (dynamic separation of duty) [66],
[62].
Whilst RBAC provides great advantages in compari-
son to traditional MAC or DAC models, in reality the
authorisation model is poorly scalable, as a correct set
of roles must still be associated to each potential user
and a correct set of permissions must be associated with
each role. The need to uniquely identify each potential
user within a single administrative domain remains. In
addition, since such models have a view that resources
6belong to the domain rather than individuals within
the domain, authorisations are always driven from an
administrator to the users and the delegation of rights is
limited to the roles/identities within the boundary of the
administrative domain [7].
5) Task-Based Authorisation Control: The underlying
design of all the above models assumes that all the
necessary privileges are available to a subject regardless
of the progress of a business function or process. For
example, assume there exists a manager role within an
organisation and sign-off project is one of the actions a
manager is allowed to perform on an object contract. The
security administrator creates a policy which authorises
the sign-off action, which would be allowed for the
manager regardless of the status of the project.
Task-Based Authorisation Control (TBAC) seeks to
model access control from a work-flow perspective
rather than the traditional subject-object perspective [39].
TBAC models security and enforcement by considering
run-time activities and tasks as they progress from start
to completion. To allow such awareness, permissions
(P ) are constantly monitored and activated/deactivated
based on the context of each task. Strictly speaking,
in a subject-object access control model, P ⊆ S ×
O × A, while TBAC requires information about two
additional domains: usage (U ), and authorisation-steps
(AS). These permissions are defined by P ⊆ S × O ×
A × U × AS. These are the additional domains that
embed task-based contextual information and draw a
distinction between TBAC and other traditional access
control models [73], [74]. In TBAC, authorisation steps
maintain their own protection state. Each protection state
is initialised with a set of valid permissions that become
active as a result of the authorisation-step. However, the
contents of this set will change as the authorisation-step
progresses and the relevant permissions are consumed.
There is a limited usage count associated with each
permission that will deactivate the permission when the
limit is reached and actions are no longer allowed in that
state.
The most obvious application of TBAC is in work-
flow management, where the granting, usage tracking
and revoking of permissions needs to be coordinated with
the progression of the various tasks. Without such an
active model, permissions will in most cases be “turned
on” too early or too late and will probably remain “on”
long after they are needed [73], [74].
Although TBAC proposes an interesting model for
access control, it puts a great burden on two components
of its authorisation mechanism: First, it requires a very
detailed and precise forecast on the side of security
administrators of the tasks and the necessary permissions
as well as conditions and their durations. Second, it
demands a detailed monitoring of tasks, which requires
very complex and distributed reference monitors that are
not widely available currently.
6) Shortcomings of Traditional Models: While the
traditional authorisation models described above address
the access control requirements for closed systems, they
fall short in several important aspects to provide access
control for open distributed systems. The shortcomings
were primarily identified by researchers such as Wee
et al. [78] and Gasser et al., [31], [30] and triggered
the research on access control approaches for distributed
systems.
Some of the weaknesses of these models for providing
support for information sharing in distributed systems
stems from the fact that such models require that iden-
tities of subjects and objects to be determined before
access could be granted [78]. The second problem is
the reliance of such models on Access Control Lists
(ACL) to express a policy, which is usually stored on
a central server under the control of a trusted admin-
istrator. However, in distributed systems resources are
usually shared between entities spread across multiple
administrative domains [29]. The third issue is due to
the need of users in distributed systems to delegate some
or all of their rights to others in order for tasks to
be shared and be completed [31]. The fourth issue is
with respect to the questionable assumption of traditional
access control models regarding the trustworthiness of
the hardware/software of the client machines [43].
These shortcomings have led to research in credential-
based authorisation architectures and models that are
discussed in the next section.
C. Credential-based Authorisation
1) Trust Management: With the increasing popularity
of PKI and credential based systems the research on
authorisations for strangers in open distributed systems
has been pursued under the name of trust management
[15], [32], [77]. Trust management in general attempts
to address authorisation scenarios where the authoriser
and requester do not know each other.
At the core of any trust management system is the
authorisation procedure that determines whether an ac-
cess to a resource should be granted or not, based on a
number of conditions including a users’ capabilities or
properties in the form of digital credentials or certificates
as well as the authoriser’s local policy which defines
the properties required for an access to be allowed. The
semantics of such an authorisation procedure is the main
focus of research in trust management as it provides
7meaning to the features supported for both the authoriser
and the access requester [55], [78]. Trust management
relies on the formal specification of policies and in
this respect, several logics have been used for policy
expression and evaluation [1] and several formal trust
management frameworks have been introduced [2], [16],
[46].
The approach of trust management to authorisation
is the binding of identities with a set of authorisations
referred to as credentials which allow the capabilities
of identity to be determined and judged based on the
relevance of their credentials to the local policy of
the resource provider [15], [14]. The trust management
model allows every entity to act as an authoriser, a
credential issuer, or a requester.
Trust management systems as described by Chapin
et al., [19] are comprised of three major components:
authorisation decision, certificate storage and retrieval
and trust negotiation. The first component focuses on ac-
cess control decisions, the second is concerned with the
physical location of certificates, credentials and policies
as well as the mechanisms involved in acquiring them
in order to make authorisation decisions, and the third
component attempts to provide the necessary protocols
that allow authorisers and requesters to bargain on the
required credentials with respect to the access being
requested.
The authorisation decision component focuses on pro-
viding formalisms for specifying local policy and cre-
dentials. Some of the major problems that exist include
the expressiveness of the language versus its decidability,
and complexity for implementation purposes. The major-
ity of existing formal models are based on three types
of formalism: graph theory, logic and relational calculus.
Certificate storage and retrieval have been mostly kept
away from the context of trust management even though
the first and third components strongly depend on this for
implementation [10], [19]. Trust negotiation goes beyond
the basic model for authorisation in which requesters are
assumed to provide all their credentials to the authorisers,
trusting them to pick the ones required for access to be
permitted. In a more realistic model requesters would
like to provide the least number of credentials needed
for access to be granted. Further, they may have polices
they need the authoriser to abide by, such as privacy
constraints over use, disclosure and retention of personal
information. The trust negotiation literature aims to
provide a framework for negotiating such bargains [68].
There are currently several trust management systems
in the literature that mainly focus on the area of autho-
risation decision or trust negotiation. For example Pol-
icyMaker [16], KeyNote [13], [42], REFEREE [22] and
Binder [24] are some examples addressing the former
problem, while PeerTrust [79] and Portune [17] focus
on the trust negotiation problem.
Although trust management systems provide a com-
prehensive and interesting authorisation framework for
distributed systems, they must still be investigated in
terms of their applicability for information sharing en-
vironments when information is sent from the realm of
the authoriser to the realm of requesters. This is due
to the fact that trust management, like other traditional
access control models, has focused on protecting digital
resources within server systems and does not deal with
client-side controls for locally stored digital information.
This is the shortcoming that motivated the research on
Digital Rights Management.
2) Digital Rights Management: Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM) is a generic term for a set of tech-
nologies and standards for client-side enforcement of
access rights [49]. The main goal of DRM is to provide
persistent access control, which allows digital content
(e.g., music files, video streams, digital books) to be
distributed between consumers and to be conditionally
accessed using different mediums such as personal com-
puters, mobile devices, etc. [70], [67].
A typical DRM model consists of a data provider who
hold rights to the content and is the only entity that can
create licenses, a distributor that is responsible for the
distribution of encrypted resources, and the consumer
who is the user of the resource. The consumer downloads
the resource from the distributor and acquires usage
licenses from data provider. The licenses are then used
by the specialised consumer devices to allow controlled
access to the resource [67], [69], [61].
To build a DRM system three main enabling factors
are required: a rights model, a management model and
a set of tools [76]. The first deals with modelling the
subjects, objects and attributes that need to be considered
within a DRM system. The second focuses on introduc-
ing the necessary architecture, procedures and protocols
to allow resources/licenses to be acquired, distributed,
delegated or revoked. The final component attempts to
implement trusted clients and management software for
a DRM system.
The core concept in DRM relates DRM components
to enable the communication of access rights in a digital
license that bundles the usage rules as well as attributes
such as cryptographic keys associated with a digital
resource. The rules usually specify a range of restrictions
on usage criteria such as no print, no transfer or an
expiration date.
Over the past years many rights expression languages
have been developed to address the construction of a
8rights model for DRM systems. The most popular of
these languages are the eXtensible rights Markup Lan-
guage (XrML) that was adopted by MPEG-21 standard
[53] and the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL)
[36] that was accepted by Open Mobile Alliance (OMA).
The major differences between these languages relates
to their expressive power to model rights, and the extent
to which they are capable of addressing management
functions, which in theory is beyond rights modelling
but more towards management of rights [37].
As we have mentioned, DRM was introduced to
address the access enforcement problem of payment-
based systems, which puts more weight on authorisation
enforcement rather than the authorisation decision and
requires less expressive authorisation models. DRM was
designed for settings where there are some known ob-
jects that need to be shared and accessed under some
specific conditions rather than the more general problem
of whether one should authorise or trust or share the
information with a user or not.
Enterprise Rights Management (ERM) is the term
used to describe the DRM approach when it is applied to
the protection of information in a corporate or enterprise
setting. As with DRM, ERM’s emphasis is on reliable
client enforcement of access policies, not the details of
the authorisation model or policy framework [4]. Most
ERM proposals deal with client-side enforcement via a
client application which is relied on to enforce access
policies. Sandhu et al. [64] provide an early example.
Assurance of the correct behaviour and ongoing integrity
of the client application is crucial to the DRM/ERM
approach. In the case of a client application running
on open computers platform that can also run arbitrary
program code, assurance can be provided by a careful
combination of a secure operating system, memory iso-
lation features of recently-available processors from Intel
and AMD, and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) based
on the Trusted Computing Group specification [59], [64].
DRM and ERM are important for information sharing
because of their focus on client-side access enforcement.
However, their lack of emphasis on authorisation means
the problems with scalability and flexibility in dynamic
environments are not addressed.
3) Usage Based Control: Park and Sandhu [54] pro-
posed a new approach to access control that adopts ideas
from traditional access control approaches, trust man-
agement and digital rights management. They coined the
term Usage CONtrol (UCON) to make a clear distinction
between the scope of their model and existing ones [55].
A defining feature of UCON is the use of attributes for
authorisation. One similarity between traditional access
control models and trust management is the use of
subject attributes as well as object attributes to pro-
duce an authorisation decision. For example, within a
MAC model object classification or the clearance level
of a subject can be considered an attribute. By the
same token, in DAC capability lists could be viewed
as subjects’ attributes and access control lists (ACL)
as object attributes. The second feature of UCON is
its consideration of environmental conditions for the
authorisation decision. For example, employees may
be forced to access sensitive resources during business
hours at certain locations [63], [54].
Furthermore, UCON allows for a usage decision to be
made conditional on the fulfilment of some prior actions.
This characteristic is referred to as an obligation and is
required in addition to authorisation to enforce a simple
form of sequencing of actions in a similar manner to
workflow-focused TBAC. For example, consenting to a
list of terms and conditions by clicking on a box prior to
being given access to a sensitive report is an obligation
[54], [55].
In addition to the above three concepts that could be
found in the traditional access control literature, UCON
introduces two important properties that are referred to
as continuity and mutability.
Continuity requires the ongoing evaluation of usage
requirements (e.g., conditions, rights, attributes) while an
access is being performed rather than the approach taken
by the traditional access control models, in which the act
of authorisation is always performed before access.
Mutability allows attributes (e.g., subject/object) to be
updated based on the subject’s actions. Traditionally,
such an update of attributes could only be done by
administrators. As Zhang et al., [83] describe “in UCON,
authorisation decisions are not only checked and made
before the access, but may be repeatedly checked during
the access and may revoke the access if some policies
are not satisfied, according to the changes of the subject
or object attributes, or environmental conditions”.
From the architectural point of view UCON supports
both traditional access control and trust management
models as well as the DRM model to enable server-
side access control, and persistent access control on the
client-side (after the resources are distributed).
In the past couple of years and particularly in 2008
UCON has gained considerable attention from the access
control research community. In terms of languages and
formalisms for UCON, Katt et al. [40] propose a general
obligation model and an enforcement engine, Jamkhed-
kar et al. [37] provide a formalism for expressing rights,
Salim et al. [60] propose an administrative framework
to enable delegation and administration of rights and
attributes, and Pretchner et al. [57] introduce a formal
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control policies on the consumer side. From the imple-
mentation and architectural perspective, UCON is being
used for virtual organisations in data grids [82].
D. Risk-based Authorisation
All the authorisation approaches that we have de-
scribed so far have one thing in common at their core;
they classify actions into two categories: authorised and
unauthorised (e.g., good/bad) and try to ensure this
separation is not violated. The problem is that for a
complex system with several requirements, the policy
that tries to predefine a crisp division is doomed to be
either bypassed or be cluttered with too many seemingly
ad-hoc exceptions.
As the demand for information sharing has increased,
the rigidity of existing approaches has motivated several
research proposals which aim to find a more flexible
method of authorisation. The work of Hosmer [34], [35]
provides an early reference to the need for more flexible
approaches in constructing policies in order to bridge the
gap between the imprecision that exists in the real world
and the precision required by classical logic. Hosmer
suggested the use of fuzzy logic [80] to bridge this gap
and provided some examples of how the application of
fuzzy logic may deliver the required flexibility. More
recent proposals that aim to go beyond binary decision
making (authorised/unauthorised) focus on the concept
of risk. In the rest of this section we will review these
recent authorisation approaches which have been directly
or indirectly inspired by the work of Hosmer.
1) Survivability Approach: Survivability research tar-
gets systems that operate in highly dynamic environ-
ments. The fundamental assumption is that the system
has a mission that must be completed even if some
compromise in system policy enforcement is to be made.
Hence, it often involves trade-offs among several func-
tional and non-functional requirements determined by
the mission of the system. In other words, the dynamic
state of the mission provides the contextual inputs that
inform the trade-off decisions.
From a technical perspective the research blends com-
puter security (i.e., as one of the requirements) with
business risk management [33] and at its core the re-
search departs from being mostly about confidentiality
and integrity of information and focuses more on the
availability and continuity of service [48], [71].
While the proposal for contextual decision making is
one of the primary motivations for our work and will be
motivated in more detail in Section V, the survivability
research has so far remained in the realm of software
and requirements engineering rather than security and
access control. Further, the proposals remain mostly
informal and abstract rather than concrete formal models
or methodologies.
2) Optimistic Approach: Another approach that at-
tempts to introduce flexibility into current authorisation
models is pursued under the title of optimistic security.
It is based on a very important assumption that, regard-
less of how flexible or expressive authorisation models
(policies) are, they will not be able to take into account
the dynamic nature of current environments. There will
be unforeseen circumstances that are not accounted for
in the access policy but which need to be effectively
handled [56].
Povey [56] discussed the need and importance of
an optimistic authorisation scheme in dynamic envi-
ronments alongside what he calls existing pessimistic
models. Povey states that the static nature of current
authorisation models can cause unexpected and unjusti-
fiable risks in dynamically changing environments such
as disasters, medical emergencies or time-critical events,
when unnecessary access restrictions may have catas-
trophic consequences. He assumes the risk of failure
and the cost of recovery is low compared to the cost
of not granting access in a given situation. To ensure
minimisation of the likelihood and consequences of a
user maliciously or inadvertently misusing the system,
he proposes that access entries must be constrained;
accountability, auditability and recovery must be possi-
ble. Povey introduces the concept of a partially formed
transaction in the Clark Wilson Integrity model [23] that
refers to transactions where the integrity of the data is not
guaranteed, but where a compensating transaction exists
to return the system to a valid state. While he discusses
how to introduce such flexibility, the focus is not to
discuss or formally justify why and under what situations
these otherwise denied requests should be granted.
Ferreira et al., [27] have also suggested that traditional
authorisation models do not allow for overriding. Their
domain of interest is healthcare and they motivate an
authorisation model that can allow for unanticipated
access to be provided in emergency situations. They have
proposed a “Break-The-Glass” policy to allow override
whilst providing a non-repudiation mechanism for its
usage. Similar to Povey’s proposal, they also assume
users have a legitimate need that will actually benefit
the whole system. However, their approach is more
application-oriented rather than formal, and like Povey,
they keep the question of how users would know and
decide outside the model.
There are two important assumptions underlying all
the above approaches: First there are circumstances
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where the negative consequences that flows from not
granting access may outweigh the potential damage
caused by granting access. Second, users are known and
dependent on the organisation and can be sanctioned for
their unnecessary accesses. Further, users are assumed
to be competent to know what is beneficial for the
organisation, hence they can judge whether the access
must be made. In other words, they take the problem
of decision making to the realm of users and outside
the authorisation model. In order to discourage users
from making selfish decisions, they assume users can
be punished for such behaviour. Moreover, the answer
to the question of whether the access was “necessary”
assumes monitoring, audit and recovery techniques are
in place.
3) Quantified Risk-based Approach: More recently,
several other approaches have been proposed to address
the inflexibility problem of authorisation by defining
and estimating the risk of granting an access. The
MITRE Jason Report [52] studied the requirements of
access control for information sharing in government,
the intelligence, law enforcement and emergency re-
sponse community. It notes that organisations deal with
inflexible access control systems using various ad-hoc
means to share information, such as providing near-
blanket access rights or “temporary” authorisations that
are never revoked. They suggest there is a need for a
parameterisable control that governs a trade-off between
security and operational needs. To address this, the report
recommends that a new authorisation model must focus
on risk and they propose a three step procedure for
building such a risk-based access control system. The
first step is to measure risk; as they put it “if you can’t
measure it, you can’t manage it”. The second step is to
specify the maximum amount of risk for each document.
For example, how many copies of a classified document
can an organisation afford to lose. The third and the
most controversial step is to ensure that information is
distributed up to the maximum acceptable risk limit.
They also introduce the concept of risk tokenisation,
where a token is something with exchange value that
the holder can trade for access. The tokenisation of risk
allows for greater flexibility as it allows limited access
to classified information by uncleared users when such
access is so important that the holder of a token is
willing to pay the price. However, although the research
introduces a change in the paradigm of thinking about
the authorisation problem, like the previously mentioned
approaches, it leaves the decision as to what should be
regarded as an important and beneficial access (for the
system) to the users. As a result, their approach is still
dependent on recovery and audit mechanisms to revert
the system if a user’s decision was not aligned to what
the system considers beneficial. Further, the idea that
pushing information sharing to the highest acceptable
risk would imply that maximum sharing of information is
an objective for the system, while in reality, information
is shared to satisfy an objective, and when there is no
known benefit in sharing, there may not be a reason to
share even if there are no known risks.
Cheng et al., [21], [20] also focus on the inflexibility
of authorisation models for information sharing in dy-
namic environments, where the set of users with whom
the information must be shared depends on external
events. They believe that authorisation is a mechanism to
manage the risk of leakage of sensitive information by
human users (within an organisation), i.e., “to balance
the information needs of the users in order to perform
their jobs with the need of the organisation to protect
its sensitive information”. Further, they continue that
“since the future needs and behaviours of users are
unpredictable, the authorisation policy is essentially an
educated guess that tries to balance future risks with
future needs”. They blame the core of the problem on
the static nature of existing authorisation policies. The
educated guesses encoded in the policy will always be
imprecise and incomplete in dynamic environments, even
if the policy had provisions for pre-specified exceptions,
since not all risk vs benefit trade-offs could have been
foreseen by the policy author.
They proposed a Quantified Risk-Adaptive Access
Control (QRAAC) for Bell-LaPadulla MLS [8] that
attempts to bring these trade-offs into the authorisation
model so that exceptions can be granted where the
associated risk can be accounted for. Consistent with the
MITRE [52] report, their goal is to encourage prudent,
calculated risk taking by users to achieve better results
while still keeping the overall risk within the organisa-
tion’s risk tolerance. In their model, there is flexible gap
between allow and deny. Within this area, transactions
could be allowed by using some risk mitigation mecha-
nisms to avoid unaccepted overall risk while increasing
information sharing. In their approach a risk is defined as
the expected value of loss due to unauthorised disclosure:
risk = v × p
where v is the value of the information and p is
the probability of unauthorised disclosure. The value
of information is defined to be the potential maximum
damage sustained if the information is disclosed in an
unauthorised manner, the unit of damage being system
specific. To determine the probability of unauthorised
disclosure is more difficult as it requires predicting future
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user behaviour. For example, within a MLS system it
is intuitive to assume that the probability would be
higher when a person without security clearance is
given access to top secret information and lower if
the person has a top secret clearance. Given this, such
probability can be estimated based on two independent
components: temptation, which is a function of both
the subject’s clearance level, that indicates the subject’s
trustworthiness, and the object sensitivity level, which
indicates the value of the object. Temptation increases
as the subject’s trustworthiness decreases or the object’s
value increases. The second component is inadvertent
disclosure. This value is represented by the difference
in compartment membership between the subject and
object. More specifically, subjects are given a fuzzy
membership for a category, which indicates the subject’s
need for information in that category. They also give
a fuzzy membership to objects for that category that
determines the relevance of this object to the category.
Hence, the willingness to share increases as the subject
and object membership increases.
While they believe in a trade-off analysis between the
risk and benefit of information sharing, they also fall
short in providing a comprehensive mechanism to allow
such a trade-off to be made. Their concept of benefit
is simplistically incorporated in the function that calcu-
lates the probability of inadvertent disclosure, within the
willingness index. It only assumes one factor and that is
the degree of membership of a category. Further, their
approach is not general and only focuses on the Bell-
LaPadulla model. Not withstanding these limitations
they have proposed a novel approach incorporating the
preliminary step of quantifying risk.
Inspired by the MITRE proposal [52], Zhang et.al
[81] also introduced a new authorisation model, Benefit
and Risk Access Control (BARAC), based on balancing
the risk of information disclosure and the benefits of
information sharing. One major distinction between this
approach and other risk based approaches is the explicit
treatment of benefits in BARAC. The authors strongly
believe that measuring the benefit of access along with
the associated risk is of crucial importance for making
an access control decision. The model is composed of
subjects, objects, read and update transactions. Each
BARAC model has a configuration on which transactions
are associated with risk and benefit vectors and some
subjects are associated with the risk of being com-
promised. Further, the configuration defines an allowed
transaction graph (AT), that captures allowed transac-
tions and their flow path, as well as an accessibility
graph (AC) which describes the accessibility of objects
by subjects in terms of the underlying communication
system. Finally they introduce two properties that must
be satisfied by the AT graph: risk cover that ensures the
total system benefit outweighs the total system risk and
weak optimality which ensures that the AT graph cannot
be improved (in terms of benefit vs risk) by adding or
deleting a transaction.
In BARAC benefit and risk are defined based on a
multidimensional resource space, where each dimension
represents a different component of risk and/or bene-
fit. For example, some of the components of risk for
a risk space may include monetary damage, risk to
national strategic interest, or human life. For each of
these components they assume an underlying discrete
probability distribution, with a finite set of outcomes,
each associated with probability and damage. So risk
becomes a mathematical expectation of damage for that
probability distribution. The benefit is measured in terms
of how much one would “pay” for the benefit, in terms
of the risk that one is ready to accept. However, since
risk and benefit are multi-dimensional, not every two
vectors are comparable, hence they consider one vector
outweighing another in all dimensions.
One important question that needs to be answered in
their model arises from the fact that users are to decide
what they are willing to pay for the risk, by actually
taking the risk (i.e. paying for it). However, in many
cases what a user assesses as beneficial may not actually
realise a benefit for the system. This approach also
takes the decision making about the risk taking outside
the model and into the realm of users of the system.
While this could be acceptable for models proposed by
Povey [56] and Ferreira et al., [27] that assumed several
recovery mechanisms, it is not clear how BARAC would
deal with this problem.
Molloy et al., [50] suggested the field of information
security be viewed as a problem of risk management.
They define risk as the expected value of damages and
treat it as a finite resource. Then, damages are the
possible outcomes of security decisions and actions.
They argue that an access control system is an attempt
to model the organisation’s notion of risk and the central
issue is where and how much risk to take, which they
refer to as the risk allocation problem. By taking this
approach, benefit and risk based authorisation would
directly address the goal of an access control system: to
manage the risk of access to sensitive data. They focus on
how to cap the aggregated organisational damage while
maximising information flow within an organisation. To
achieve this they suggest that the organisation must
set up a risk token market where it releases a fixed
number of risk tokens that can be traded by users
amongst themselves using the internal currency issued
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to them. For a given access request by a user for an
object, the access control system determines a risk value
quantified in terms of risk tokens. Further, they assume
the information objects are accessed to produce benefits
which are enumerated in terms of the internal currency.
One very important observation is that they assume these
benefits to be context dependent, evolving over time.
Therefore, they cannot be determined a priori. Such a
dynamic situation implies that the same information ob-
ject becomes less or more beneficial in different contexts
and may cause more or less damage. As a proof of
concept they have built a simulation to show the risk-
based authorisation out-performs the existing traditional
approaches by increasing information sharing as well as
security in Bell-LaPadulla [8] (without compartments).
There have been other proposals in the literature
that attempt to incorporate risk with access control.
For example, Agrawal [3] mentions that for systems
operating in a dynamic environment, the traditional static
policy is insufficient and they suggest the need for
mechanisms to monitor the overall environment and feed
the observations back to the access control system. They
assume the authorisation model in the system is already
capable of making risk vs benefit trade-offs, such as one
of the above mentioned models. Nissanke and Khayat
[51] proposed “risk graphs” to be used to analyse the
risk associated with permissions of roles in an RBAC
model.
V. TOWARDS AN OBJECTIVE-BASED ACCESS
CONTROL
In this section we analyse the weakness of current risk
based models and outline a new authorisation approach
whose defining feature is the inclusion of the concept of
multiple competing objectives.
When an access control system or policy interferes
with the attainment of legitimate organisational objec-
tives, ad-hoc exceptions and ‘work-arounds’ are com-
monly introduced to circumvent the restrictions. The
MITRE report [52] highlights the problems associated
with this response, the chief of which is an uncapped
and unknown risk exposure. We believe, based on our
analysis of the authorisation literature, that when excep-
tions to an access control system are rife, they must be
regarded as a symptom of the inadequate specification
of authorisation policy which itself is a product of a
poor prediction of the dynamic incentives and forces that
govern the needs of the system.
The research on risk-based authorisation approaches
demonstrates the need to focus on another aspect of
authorisation theory that has been taken for granted,
and that is a priori to any policy: that is, how the
system decides whether to share information. Here, we
say ‘system decides’ rather than authorisation system
to emphasize that the decision is based on several
system objectives which evolve according to system
needs within a changing environment (context). The
primary step for the shift in thinking about authorisation
began with the risk-based approaches to authorisation
that we have surveyed, where they all attempt to allow
unpredicted exceptions to the policy to be accounted
for. However, these approaches are still entangled with
the traditional view, that a comprehensive policy exists
that governs actions. These approaches attacked the
inflexibility problem by introducing a grey area within
which the access is viable if it stays within a defined
risk limit. The underlying motivation of all the above
approaches to flexible authorisation is to address the
systems’ needs. This need is abstracted in terms of a
benefit to be gained from sharing information.
These approaches divide the problem into two aspects:
first they attempt to make the authorisation policy flex-
ible by incorporating risk; second, they introduce the
concept of benefit to justify the risk. However we observe
that in practice, the benefits cannot be determined a
priori. Therefore, these models must pass the decision
making about what the benefits are together with the
risk of attempting to secure such benefits, to the users
through for example, providing risk tokens (risk based
approaches) [84], [50] or enabling users to ask for ex-
ceptional permissions (i.e., optimistic approaches) [56],
[27]. However, the limitation of these proposals is that
the concept of benefit is not clear. What is considered
to be beneficial is assumed to be decided by the users,
without reference to what the system recognises as a
benefit within a context. Furthermore, the complexity
arises when the benefit for the users differs from the
system’s benefit. We speculate that this gap can be
bridged when there is a framework through which the
system can define its needs. This would essentially
provide a reference point to where the compromises are
viable and what a benefit is from system’s perspective
(i.e. given the context).
It is our belief that the shift towards an analytic
approach for authorisation is an important one. Like any
other decision where there are alternatives, there must
be a way to justify the decision. It is our hypothesis
that an authorisation framework must allow for explicit
specification of underlying factors for an authorisation
decision rather than just an expressive language for
expressing already made decisions as a policy. Policies
can perform well if considered as a definition of a single
objective. The problem arises when several objectives
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(requirements) are analysed and distilled into a set of
rules of a policy for future decision making in a dynamic
environment.
A. Introducing Objectives to Authorisation
The sharing of information and protection of its
‘security’ are two inherently conflicting objectives of
today’s interrelated collaborating systems. One funda-
mental problem is how and based on what factors these
needs must be balanced such that the overall objective
of the systems is best satisfied. To date, the research in
authorisation has worked around this complex problem
by assuming the trade-off between these objectives can
be made a priori. Figure 1 depicts the current boundary
of the authorisation aspect of access control research.
O1 O2 O3 On
Trade-off
Needs
PolicyRequest Response
Access Control
Figure 1. The boundary of an existing authorisation system
While the above approach reduces the complexity
of authorisation significantly and directs its focus to
languages and mechanisms for expressing and enforcing
policies, it also makes the authorisation system rigid
and inflexible. Figure 1 shows that since the trade-off
analysis is considered a priori and external, the changing
needs (objectives, labelled O in the figure) of the system
cannot directly reflect on the authorisation function. The
scale of this problem is directly proportional to the
dynamism of the environment and the frequency of the
changing needs.
To introduce a scalable authorisation framework we
propose casting the authorisation problem as a multi-
objective decision problem [41], based on the core objec-
tives of the system (O), rules specifying their satisfaction
definition (P), and a set of functions that determine the
relevance and importance of the objectives for a given
context.
Trade-off
Needs
O1 O2 O3 OnRequest Response
Access Control
P P P P
Figure 2. The boundary of an objective-based access control system
Figure 2 provides a high level representation of the
components of the proposed framework. We believe
such an authorisation framework has several interesting
properties (e.g., transparency, intuitiveness, scalability,
and systematic handling of exceptions) that are missing
from existing authorisation models, simply due to their
limited boundary.
B. Properties of an Objective-based Access Control
A typical system usually has several objectives that
often conflict (e.g. confidentiality and availability). Fur-
ther, given the context, the importance of these objectives
may change. This makes a simple authorisation based on
a predefined static policy infeasible for dynamic environ-
ments. As was mentioned in Section V-A, we propose
the explicit inclusion of objectives in the authorisation
model to address this problem. We hypothesize that our
proposal will have the following desired properties:
• Transparency: the objectives (goals/reasons) in-
forming an access decision can be explicitly speci-
fied.
• Dynamism: given changes in the weight and impor-
tance of objectives, the posture of the authorisation
changes. Note that this is without changing the
definition of objectives.
• Scalability/Incrementally Evolving: to allow new
objectives to be added incrementally and take affect
in decision making, without the need to re-evaluate
all the existing objectives and procedures for ad-
dressing them.
• Compromising: to allow some of the explicit ob-
jectives (of less importance) be sacrificed for the
satisfaction of the objectives of higher importance.
This is based on how the trade-off machinery is
specified.
• Opportunistic: opportunism arises as a consequence
of the scalability and compromising capabilities.
Opportunism implies that the system can take ad-
vantage of a new and unpredictable circumstance
which can positively contribute to the satisfaction
(increase) of some of the objectives.
• Justifiability and systematic handling of exceptions:
to be able to explain why a specific decision was
made based on the objectives. In existing authori-
sation models, exceptions are usually due to un-
predicted circumstances and their existence is to
satisfy specific objectives. Hence, their occurrence
may be explained with respect to the conflicting
objectives and the trade-off analysis of the system.
This property may address increasing demands for
accountable governance.
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VI. RESEARCH AGENDA FOR OBJECTIVE-BASED
ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we outline a research agenda for the
exploration of the concept of Objective-based Access
Control. First, we raise some difficult questions that
must be answered to fully operationalise the concept.
Their difficulty flows from the motivation, inherent in
the proposal, to systematically formalise processes of
analysis and decision making that are currently carried
out by humans based on imprecise and incomplete infor-
mation. The concept does not require that such complex
trade-offs be fully automated though the necessary extent
of human involvement is presently unclear. We then
propose a set of simplifying assumptions that permit a
foothold on a simpler, core set of problems, which are
enumerated.
The very concept of an Objective-based Access Con-
trol system for dynamic environments raises several
important and challenging questions. For example:
• How can changes in the environment that affect
the information sharing attitude of a system be
registered or recognised in or by the system? Fur-
thermore, how can such changes translate into a
modification of the relative importance of objec-
tives?
• How can the consequences of a decision be detected
and interpreted? The idea here is that every decision
has a consequence and since the consequences can
be only seen in the future, how should these changes
be monitored?
• How can a system learn from the consequences and
make more “desirable” decisions in the future?
• How can a system deal with uncertainty about
consequences? In other words, how can it make an
authorisation decision when it is unclear what the
consequences of the access will be?
• How can the relative importance of objectives be
negotiated and agreed by multiple, interested but
independent decision makers in an information shar-
ing context?
While these are interesting research questions it is
clear that they do not have simple answers. Fortunately,
we do not believe that it is necessary to address them as
a precondition of being able to investigate the basic con-
cept of an Objective-based Access Control. We propose
a number of simplifying assumptions to permit a focus
on the basic problem of how objectives can be explicitly
included in authorisation decisions, namely that:
• changes in the environment do affect the objectives
within the system. However, at least initially, it
is not necessary to consider how these external
changes actually translate to the internal objective
changes.
• there is a unitary decision maker who specifies the
relative importance of objectives.
• the decision maker is capable of predicting the
consequences of modifying the importance of ob-
jectives or introducing the new objectives. This
simplifies the problem as it permits a focus on
the internal changes of objectives rather than the
question of whether the authorisation decision turns
out to bring about the desired results.
With these simplifying assumptions in place, it should
be possible to focus the core concept of an Objective-
based Access Control. The following concepts, lan-
guages and mechanisms need to be developed and are
the focus of our work.
• a theory and language for the succinct classification
and specification of objectives,
• a related specification for defining the achievement
of objectives and the quantification of this achieve-
ment,
• theories and mechanisms to allow simple trade-off
analysis between the objectives in the system.
We hypothesize that techniques from the discipline of
economics related to game theory may provide a useful
starting point. Autonomic computing may also provide
useful insights.
Building on this fundamental theory, the following
opportunities for further investigation are suggested:
• How can the notion of objectives be used within the
existing risk-based approaches to authorisation? We
conjecture, the explicit specification of objectives
and their importance given the context can be
used to provide a guideline for the market based
approaches in determining what benefits are with
respect to the systems’ needs. In other words, the
proposed framework is to be considered as a central
definition of what objectives the system is willing
to take the most risk on (highest importance) and
given these, users in a market based model can use
their risk tokens on the tasks which they believe
satisfy the system’s need.
• Based on (presently unknown) strengths and limi-
tations, what are the existing environments that the
proposed model is most suitable for? One criteria
is the frequency of the changes in incentives and
forces that prompt the relative changes in objec-
tives of the system. Another is the complexity of
objectives.
• What is the assurance level required? Note that
most of our focus has been on the flexibility and
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scalability of authorisation framework. Here, we
need to ask the question, whether the framework can
be used for applications that need a specific level of
assurance with respect to information security goals
such as confidentiality, integrity and availability.
• What are the complexity issues with respect to the
number of objectives?
The concept of Objective-based Access Control rep-
resents a seismic shift in approach, raising a raft of
challenging questions. However, we believe that indepen-
dent developments in fields relevant to the understanding
and modelling of how humans make complex decisions,
and successful approaches to formalise some of these
decisions, give cause for some optimism that the idea is
worth exploring further.
VII. CONCLUSION
The application context of information sharing has
revealed an important internal limitation in the current
theory of access control: namely the required existence
of a static policy which is based on a priori trade-
off analysis between competing objectives. Information
sharing in pursuit of activities such as emergency re-
sponse, national security and critical infrastructure pro-
tection, occur in an inherently dynamic environment
where the opportunities and threats are impossible to
predict. Thus, the outcome of a priori trade-off is likely
to be sub-optimal and demand a broad rewriting of policy
or ad-hoc exceptions in response to actual circumstances.
We have proposed the concept of Objective-based Access
Control to address this fundamental problem. Based
on our survey of the authorisation literature, we have
argued that it is necessary to stretch the boundary of
authorisation from a decision expression problem that
focuses on enriching policy expression languages, to
a decision making problem. Our proposed Objective-
based Access Control concept aims to provide a modular
multi-objective authorisation framework that explicitly
specifies and considers objectives of a decision problem.
The trade-offs between decisions can then be defined
based on needs to determine an authorisation decision.
To do this, we have proposed casting the authorisation
problem as a decision problem to answer “why” an
access should be granted based on a late trade-off
analysis between the explicitly defined objectives. We
believe that this will enable the framework to realize
two important concepts, compromise and opportunity
necessary to act in unpredicted circumstances where
information sharing may become necessary or become
desirable as the changes in the environment introduce
new forces or incentives. We hypothesize that this can
deliver the necessary flexibility and scalability without
compromising increasing important principles of gover-
nance where decisions are required to be justified.
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